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The Bioengineering Revolution: Genesis
of a Compromise Solution
A vigorous bioengineering' industry rapidly evolved 2 in the early
1970s from the discovery of techniques to manipulate and modify the
genetic material in living cells.' Using recombinant DNA4 technology,
bioengineers can create new life forms with beneficial applications
ranging from toxic wastes to agriculture.5 To attain the benefits of the
newly created life forms, the organisms must be released into the
environment. 6 The introduction of genetically altered organisms into
the environment prompts fears of ecological catastrophe and generates
suits to enjoin the free release of bioengineered organisms. 7 Opposition
1. Bioengineering is defined as the intentional manipulation of the genetic material in
living cells. Biotechnology is a more general term encompassing traditional industrial uses of
biological processes. Winemaking, beer brewing and cheesemaking are examples of traditional
biotechnology. See OFnicE oF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS: MICRO-
ORGANISMS, PLANTS AND ANIMtAS 4, 137-40 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 OTA REPORT].
2. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 3, 65-113 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 OTA REPORT] (analysis of the development
of the bioengineering industry). The impetus for commercialization of recombinant DNA
techniques for specific products initially came from small entrepreneurial firms but industrial
giants such as Chevron, Monsanto and Miles Laboratories are now heavily investing in
biotechnology research and development. San Francisco Chron., Oct. 1, 1987, at A17, col. 6.
3. See Kusher, The Development and Utilization of Recombinant DNA Technology, in
RECOMBINANT DNA: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PoLrrICS, 49-53 (Richard ed. 1978) (describes
history and potential of recombinant DNA technology to create new life forms).
4. Recombinant DNA (rDNA) refers to DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) that has been
recombined in a structure different from its original configuration. See Glossary of Biotech-
nology Terms 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 253 (1986) (contains definitions of biotechnology terms used
in this comment).
5. See generally Chakrabarty, Recombinant DNA: Areas of Potential Applications, in
THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE 56 (Jackson & Stich ed. 1979) [hereinafter rDNA Debate].
An organism that could be useful in the eradication of oil spills was developed with recombinant
DNA technology. NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1976, at 374-75. See also 1984 OTA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 5-7.
6. Release into the environment of a genetically altered organism (single-celled or mul-
ticellular) is referred to as "free release." This definition encompasses both deliberate and
accidental releases.
7. The injunctions concerning biotechnology involve situations where the newly created
recombinant DNA incorporated into cells (in either single-celled or multicellular organisms)
would range free in the environment. See, e.g., Foundation on Economic Trends v. Block,
No. 84-3045 (D.D.C. 1986) (Foundation on Economic Trends sought to halt the permanent
implantation of new genetic information into sheep and pigs); Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp.
668 (D.D.C. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction against implanting new genes into
enfeebled strains of E. colt, a bacterium, denied); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler,
756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (NIH granted approval for application of genetically altered
bacteria to plots of beans, potatoes and tomatoes in Northern California).
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to free release is buttressed by recombinant DNA scientists who disagree
about the safety of the technology.8
No federal agency has express authority to regulate the recombinant
DNA industry and address the environmental concerns posed by the
free release of genetically altered organisms. The existing regulatory
framework is comprised of several agencies which have overlappingjurisdictions and conflicting regulations. 9 The complexity and inconsis-
tency of the present regulatory scheme increases the possibility that
detrimental releases will occur because of inadequate review of the
ecological consequences of deliberate release. Accidental detrimental
releases are also more likely because the present regulatory scheme has
no mechanism for compelling industry compliance with safety precau-
tions. Bioengineering firms may decide to not seek official approval
for deliberate release rather than invite the frustrations of regulatory
complexities. Thus, under the existing regulatory scheme, free release
of genetically altered organisms may occur without adequate public
review of the risks associated with dispersal into the environment.10
Liability for harm caused by genetically altered organisms has not
been established in a court of law. The unsettled question of liability
creates problems for bioengineering firms and victims of genetically
altered products. Victims may be denied compensation because of
problems with proof of causation, statutes of limitation, defects not
discoverable at the time of use, governmental immunity, and restrictions
on class action suits." For bioengineering firms, the indeterminate
extent of liability for genetically altered products creates problems in
implementing the new technology because of the lack of insurance and
adequate capitalization.2 Insurance companies are reluctant to insure
8. See Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: AHistory of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1019, 1049-53(1978) (scientists disagree about possibility of epidemics caused by bioengineered organisms,
risks associated with introducing new organisms into the ecology, and possibility of destroying
naturally occurring barrier to genetic exchange between species).
9. See Naumann, Federal Regulation of Recombinant DNA Technology: Time for
Change, I HIGH TECH. L.J. 61 (1986) (describes existing regulatory framework). See also
Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of Biotechnology Research,
17 ENVm. L. 183 (1987).
10. See, e.g., AGS to Pay $13,000 Fine for Test, 10 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Advanced
Genetic Sciences of Oakland, Calif. illegally injected genetically altered material into trees
growing on the firm's roof).
11. See infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text (discusses plaintiff's obstacles to recovery
in rDNA suit).
12. See O'Reilly, Biotechnology Meets Products Liability: Problems Beyond the State of
the Art, 24 Hous. L. REv. 451 (1987) (describing problems faced by bioengineering industry
with state of the art defense and problems caused by lack of precedential cases). See also
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against extensive liability when dealing with unsettled areas of the law. 3
Capital can become scarce when investors are wary and unsure of
potentially massive liability. Thus, plaintiffs may overcome all the legal
obstacles and remain uncompensated if the bioengineering firm is forced
into bankruptcy due to undercapitalization and inadequate insurance
coverage.
This comment suggests a legislative scheme that will encourage the
development of the recombinant DNA industry 4 and provide a legal
mechanism for assuring compensation for victims harmed by genetically
altered organisms." The proposed legislative solution will impose ab-
solute liability on both manufacturers and users of genetically altered
organisms with a cap on the aggregate amount of liability for harm
caused by any single organism. 16 To encourage both industry compliance
with federal regulation and public scrutiny of possible risks, the cap
on liability will be afforded only to firms that fully comply with federal
regulations. 17
Part I of this comment examines the unique risks associated with
genetically altered organisms.' 8 Part II briefly reviews the existing
regulatory framework for free release products. 19 Problems faced by
bioengineering manufacturers that discourage innovation and imple-
mentation of the new technology are discussed in Part III. 20 Part III
also discusses possible problems faced by a defendant in a products
Note, Designer Genes That Don't Fit: A Tort Regime for Commercial Releases of Genetic
Engineering Products, 100 HAxv. L. REv. 1086, 1100-01 (1987).
13. See Note, supra note 12, at 1100-01.
14. Although commentators disagree about whether the new biotechnology is needed or
should even be allowed, governmental support for biotechnology is manifested in the policy
statement jointly published for several federal agencies by the Office of Science & Technology.
51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986). But cf. J. RIFI, ALGENY 18-19 (1983) (leading opponent of
biotechnology argues that employing rDNA technology leads to a "designed" world and that
it is better to "participate with rather than dominate nature.").
15. The proposal encompasses free release products of the type at issue in Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See supra note 7. Drugs that
are the byproduct of a genetically altered organism or process and other bioengineered products
that have less potential for affecting vast numbers of people from a single use or application
of the product are not included in the proposed legislation.
16. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text. Discussion of the actual dollar amount
to be set as the cap on liability is beyond the scope of this comment.
17. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 25-57 and accompanying text (discussion of risks associated with rDNA
technology).
19. See infra notes 58-86 and accompanying text (review of regulatory framework).
20. See infra notes 87-113 and accompanying text (discusses problems caused by lack of
precedential cases and possibility of massive liability and analyzes bases of strict liability for
bioengineered organisms).
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liability action involving genetically altered organisms.2' Obstacles faced
by plaintiffs which reduce the likelihood of receiving compensation for
harm caused by bioengineered products are addressed in Part IV. 22 The
development of the nuclear industry, which is similar to recombinant
DNA technology because of the novel and remote risks associated with
the industry, is reviewed in part V. Part V also examines the Price-
Anderson Act which Congress enacted to encourage private participa-
tion in the nuclear industry.2 Finally, this comment in Part VI proposes
legislation incorporating some of the liability-limiting tactics used in
the Price-Anderson Act to encourage development of the nuclear
industry.24 The provisions borrowed from Price-Anderson are modified
to accommodate the needs of both the recombinant DNA industry and
victims of a recombinant DNA catastrophe. These modifications are
recommended to ensure fairness to litigants and guarantee compensa-
tion. This comment concludes that the unique nature of the risks
associated with genetically altered organisms requires a Congressional
solution formulated outside the boundaries of the traditional tort
system.
I. RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY
The physical characteristics of an organism are controlled by inher-
itance factors known as genes. 26 Genetic information is contained
within the structural form of the biological molecule DNA (deoxyri-
bonucleic acid).2 7 Recombinant DNA technology involves restructuring
the DNA contained in a cell.2
21. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text (discussion of jury bias and erosion of
state of the art defense).
22. See infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text (examines obstacles faced by rDNA
plaintiff).
23. See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 177-204 and accompanying text.
25. An inheritance factor transmits hereditary characters.
26. See generally D. MERRELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETICS 555 (1975).
27. B. LEWIN, GENES 22-26 (1983). The DNA molecule is composed of linear arrangements
of varying orders of four compounds known as nucleotides-adenine, thymine, cytosine, and
guanine. The specific order of these nucleotides defines the genetic code which in turn dictates
the physical form and function of the organism.
28. The basic technique used in recombinant DNA technology is to first splice (recombine)
lengths of DNA. The newly created molecule is then incorporated into a host cell. The host
cell might be a single-celled organism such as a bacterium or the host cell might have come
from a multicellular organism. Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, 233 Sci. AM. 24, 25 (July
1975).
The pieces of DNA used in the splicing process are created by using restriction enzymes.
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Since the physical form and functions of a cell are controlled by the
structure of the DNA, a cell containing foreign DNA may behave
differently than the cell in its natural form.29 When introduced into a
single-celled organism such as a bacterium, the new DNA can turn the
bacterium into a "minifactory"-producing human insulin,3 0 human
growth hormone, 3' and other biological compounds difficult to produce
in mass quantities by conventional technologies. 32 Changing the gene
structure may also modify the outward physical characteristics and
resulting interaction of the cell with the environment. For example, if
a bacteria serves as a nucleating agent for ice particles, 33 the genes
causing ice nucleation can be deleted using recombinant DNA tech-
niques. 34 When the ice-minus bacteria35 is later broadcast onto a crop,
frost formation will be inhibited, allowing the crop to survive freezing
temperatures. 36
Scientists working with recombinant DNA technology disagree about
the risks associated with genetic engineering methodology and the
possible ecological consequences that may result from releasing genet-
ically altered organisms into the environment. 37 Three major risks exist:
(1) the most commonly used research organism is capable of infecting
humans, (2) the bioengineered organism may have an unknown capacity
to cause disease, and (3) the organism may not behave as predicted.
The main research organism in the early days of recombinant DNA
These enzymes cut the DNA molecule at specific predetermined sites. B. Lewin, supra note
27, at 50-51. Enzymes act as catalysts for chemical reactions. The protein part of the enzyme
confers specificity for a particular chemical reaction on its non-protein part. Thus a particular
restriction enzyme (known as a restriction endonuclease) will only cause cleavage at a particular
part of the DNA strand that corresponds to the specific molecular configuration required by
that enzyme. Cohen, supra, at 25.
The DNA pieces are then spliced onto a vector DNA molecule that can enter the host cell.
The vector DNA molecule is usually a plasmid or a virus. Plasmids are small extrachromosomal
circular loops of DNA. They are easily isolated from bacterial cells. When foreign DNA has
been recombined with the plasmid, they can then be reincorporated in the host cell. B. LEWIN,
supra note 27, at 300-02.
29. Id. at 42.
30. See Redfern, Biogenetic Hormones: Insulin Trial, 286 NATURE 436 (1980) (use of
insulin produced with rDNA technology).
31. See San Francisco Chron., Oct. 1, 1987, at A16, col. 2 (report on commercial
applications of rDNA technology).
32. Id.
33. The natural process of ice particle formation uses bacteria as nucleating agents. The
bacterium serves as a kernel (nucleus) around which the ice particle grows.
34. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
35. When the genes causing ice nucleation are deleted, the resulting bacteria are referred
to as ice-minus bacteria.
36. See Foundation on Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at 152.
37. See Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, supra note 8, at 1049-53.
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technology was Escherichia col 5 (E. coli). Because this organism is a
common inhabitant of the human intestinal tract, some scientists feared
that a virulent form of E. coli could escape from containment and
cause an epidemic. 39 Even though scientists generally work with weak-
ened strains of E. coli, the possibility exists that the original weakened
organism may acquire a pathogenic trait 4° which could be transferred
to a non-weakened strain of antibiotic-resistant E. coli.41
Scientists working with a test organism may be unaware that the
organism contains a pathogenic trait. 42 Pathogenicity may be uninten-
tionally transferred with the beneficial gene during the recombination
process. However, the disease-causing capability of the organism would
remain unknown until the right environmental factors trigger expression 41
of the pathogenic gene. 44
Organisms often behave differently in a laboratory environment than
in a natural environment. When dealing with toxic-destroying bacteria
or microclimate-changing organisms,4 bioengineers attempt to use or-
ganisms with a limited capacity for survival.T The goal of the bioen-
gineers is to use an organism that will serve a useful function and then
38. Escherichia col is a common bacterium.
39. Lederberg, The Least Hazardous Course: Recombinant DNA Technology as an Option
for Human Genetic, Viral, and Cancer Therapy, in RECOMBINANT MOLECULES: I1PACT ON
SCIENCE AND Socimry 488 (R. Beers & E. Bassett eds. 1977).
40. A pathogenic trait in a bacterium means the bacterium can cause disease.
41. Thomasson, Recombinant DNA: The Uncertainties of Regulation, CURRENT, Mar./
Apr. 1980, at 33. A commonly used strain is E. coli K-12 which after years of cultivation is
practically incapable of survival outside the confines of a laboratory environment because of
competition from wild strains of E. colt. DNA from dead bacteria is also transferable to living
bacteria. Loechler, McLellan, Park, Shore, Thacher, & Youderian, Social and Political Issues
in Genetic Engineering, in GENETIC ENGINEERING 169, 170 (Chakrabarty ed. 1978) [hereinafter
Loechler].
42. Scientists have expressed particular concern about accidentally creating antibiotic-
resistant pathogenic bacteria. Because the plasmids which are often used to introduce the
foreign DNA into the cells are antibiotic resistant, the possibility of inducing resistance to
antibiotics in the genetically altered organism is increased. Loechler, supra note 41, at 170. By
using antibiotic-resistant plasmids to introduce foreign DNA, the bioengineer can select those
organism which have successfully incorporated the plasmids from those that have not by
including antibiotics in the medium used to grow the organisms. Cohen, supra note 28, at 27-
28.
43. Expression of a gene is always the result of the interaction of gene and environment.
A seedling, for instance, may have the genetic capacity to turn green, flower, or fruit. However,
if kept in the dark, the seedling will never turn green. It may not flower or fruit unless certain
precise environmental factors exist.
44. Lederberg, supra note 39, at 488.
45. Ice-minus bacteria is an example of an organism that is useful because it can affect
the climate in a very limited area surrounding the plants upon which it is broadcast.
46. The dangers described for E. coli, supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text, are
equally applicable to other species of bacteria such as the ice-minus strains of Pseudomonas
syringae and Erwiria herbicola.
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quickly die. If the organisms do not die as predicted or behave
differently once released from an artificial environment, long-term
changes in the ecology and climate could be effected by the novel
organisms. For example, an organism designed to digest oil spills could
menace the world's oil supplies if it did not die as predicted.47 Nitrogen-
fixing plants created by bioengineering might alter the entire nitrogen
cycle and cause irreversible climatic change. 8
Introducing novel species into the ecology always carries a risk of
unpredictability as evidenced by kudzu vine in the south, dutch elm
disease, and eucalyptus in California. 49 Ecological risk analyses are
difficult to calculate and interpret.50 Recombinant DNA technology
compounds the difficulty of ecological risk analysis because genetic
engineering permits the breaching of natural barriers between species.,
The mixing of genetic material between species is a difficult factor for
the ecologist to assess. Furthermore, the delicate ecological balance is
poorly understood at present. Thus, ecologists cannot predict whether
the dispersal of recombinant DNA organisms will lead to a disturbance
in the ecology. 2
Microorganisms are rapidly distributed worldwide. 3 Bacteria can be
carried by the wind and deposited far from the original site of
application.5 4 Microorganisms causing disease in humans are difficult
47. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 n. 1 (1980).
48. See Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
911, 914 n. 16 (1977); Lovins, Nitrogen Fixation, 255 NATURE 8, 8 (1975).
49. See King, New Diseases in New Niches, 276 NATURE 4, 6-7 (1978) (kudzu was
introduced in the south as an ornamental plant and is now a ubiquitous feature of the
landscape, growing uncontrollably; dutch 61m disease was introduced accidentally into America
and has devastated the elm population and wreaked havoc on the visual ambience of American
cities; eucalyptus was introduced into California without the natural checks to growth found
in its native Australia and has spread throughout California, transforming the landscape).
50. Weiss, Engineered Microbes Stay Close to Home, 133 Sci. Naws 117, (1988).
51. See J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD 130 (1977). The mixing of genetic material between
species may occur naturally but some scientists argue rDNA technology magnifies the risk of
a detrimental mix because the mixing will be done on a much greater scale. Scientists are
particularly concerned about exchanges of genetic material between organisms with primitive
cell structures (prokaryotes) and higher organisms (eukaryotes). Some scientists have hypoth-
esized a naturally occurring barrier exists to exchanges of genetic material between prokaryotes
and eukaryotes. The risk for recombinant DNA technologists is that by breaching the naturally
occurring barrier to exchanges of genetic material, the prokaryotes will be endowed with the
capacity for infecting eukaryotes and that prokaryotes could become reservoirs for common
eukaryotic viruses. See Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, 11 GA. L. REv.
785, 793 n. 33 (1977). See also Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, supra note 8, at 1048-50.
52. See Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, supra note 8, at 1049. See also Wade, Recombinant
DNA: The Last Look Before the Leap, 192 Sci. 236 (1976).
53. See Halvorson, DNA and the Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167, 1178 (1978).
54. Id.
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to contain in this era of intercontinental jet transportation." Containing
deleterious effects will be impossible 6 if no effective control mechansim
is found to limit the spread of a microorganism.
7
II. FEDERAL REGULATION
A. Constitutional Authority for Federal Regulation
The commerce clause is the primary basis for federal regulation
regarding the environment. 8 Under the commerce clause, Congress has
authority to regulate the interstate shipment of genetically altered
organisms.5 9 Constitutional authority to regulate the direct release of
bioengineered organisms within a state depends on whether the activity
"affects" interstate commerce 0 The nexus between interstate commerce
and the local intrastate activity does not depend on a direct commercial
relationship but may be the practical consequence of the local activity.6 '
Even if the specific instance of local activity cannot be found to affect
commerce, the aggregation of several instances of the same activity
can justify federal regulation. 2
Interstate commerce will be affected by bioengineered organisms if
disruptions in the ecology result from free release. The effects of a
free release are unlikely to be confined within the boundaries of one
state. For example, if bioengineered ice-minus bacteria displaced natural
strains of ice-nucleating bacteria, altered rainfall patterns and disrup-
55. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is believed to have originated in Africa
but rapidly spread worldwide.
56. But see Weiss, supra note 50, at 117 (bioengineered bacteria that were used to coat
wheat seeds exhibited very little migration through the soil).
57. See Halvorson, supra note 53, at 1177.
58. U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (West
1982), Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West 1982), Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West 1982).
59. The commerce clause states: "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States .. " U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See 41 Fed. Reg.
27,914 (1976).
60. See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342
(1914) (these cases outline some general principles in applying the commerce clause).
61. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41-42 (1937) (labor stoppage in intrastate
manufacturing operations was found to have substantial effect on interstate commerce because
of multi-state network of operations).
62. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (federal regulations of wheat grown
solely for home consumption upheld based on the potential aggregate impact this kind of
wheat could have on interstate markets).
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tions in the agricultural economy would clearly extend beyond the state
border. Even if a particular genetically altered organism poses no
apparent threat to interstate commerce, the aggregate potential for
harm to the environment from free releases in general justifies federal
regulation under the commerce clause.
B. Existing Regulatory Framework
Several federal agencies are authorized to regulate recombinant DNA
technology. 63 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) promulgated
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules64
(Guidelines) with the aid of the Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee.65 The Guidelines are specifically designed to govern basic aca-
demic research. 6 Because the Guidelines bind only institutions or
persons receiving NIH funding, free release activities by industry are
inadequately regulated. Voluntary compliance on the part of the genetic
engineering industry is the only means by which the Guidelines could
effectively curb unsafe practices. 67
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has broad authority
under the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA)6 to regulate biotech-
nology.69 The TSCA permits the EPA to regulate chemical substances, 70
and the EPA has determined that genetically engineered organisms are
included in the definition of "chemical substance." ' 71 Under the TSCA,
however, direct releases conducted for either commercial or noncom-
63. See generally Naumann, supra note 9, at 61; Fogleman, supra note 9, at 183 (analysis
of the federal regulatory scheme as applied to recombinant DNA technology and research).
64. 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958, 16,960 (1986).
65. 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958 (1986) (Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee was chartered
in 1974 by the NIH).
66. Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Authority of
the FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, 35 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 633, 648
(1980).
67. See Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Guide-
lines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,564 (1983)
(provision encouraging industry participation was drafted in January, 1980).
68. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2929 (West 1982).
69. See McGarity, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Biotechnology, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: RIsK AND REGULATION 137, 149 (1985) (TSCA is the most comprehensive
statute under which biotechnology could be regulated).
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2603 (West 1982). See id. § 2602(2)(A) (1982) ("chemical substance"
defined as "any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, includ-
ing. . .any combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a
chemical reaction or occurring in nature ... ").
71. Statement of Policy, Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,324 (1986).
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mercial research purposes are exempt from EPA regulation.72 The EPA
can regulate pesticides manufactured with recombinant DNA technology
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)7"
upon finding that the genetically altered organism is a pesticide. 74 A
significant disadvantage to using FIFRA as authority for regulating
bioengineered organisms is that the Act was not written to apply to
recombinant DNA organisms. 75 Therefore, authority of the EPA to
regulate bioengineered organisms under FIFRA will depend on whether
the courts defer to the agency's broad interpretation of the term
"pesticide."76
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) sponsor and regulate genetic engi-
neering research, including free release experiments. NSF is the primary
governmental supporter of research into the effects genetically altered
organisms have on the environment, but regulatory authority is limited
to NSF sponsored research. 77 Authority for USDA regulation of free
release is based on the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA)78 and the Federal
Plant Pest Act (FPPA).79 Because FPPA applies only when pests can
harm plants, if a bioengineered organism threatens only human health
or the environment, the USDA is powerless to act.80 Furthermore, the
72. See Fogleman, supra note 9, at 258 (TSCA does not apply to research).
73. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1982) (pesticide is defined as "(1) any substance ...
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance
... intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant").
74. See, e.g., Fogleman, supra note 9 at 251 (genetically engineered ice-minus bacteria
are classified as pesticides due to their capacity to replace ice-nucleating bacteria. Ice-nucleating
bacteria are considered pests because they cause frost damage to crops).-
75. Id. at 254 (FIFRA inapplicable to genetically engineered organisms if statute's defi-
nition of "pesticide" is narrowly construed to mean "substance").
76. See Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of "Biorational" Pesticides; Policy
Statement and Notice of Availability of Background Document, 44 Fed. Reg. 28,093, 28,094
(1979) ("language of FIFRA gives the Agency a very broad regulatory authority. As applied
to biological pesticides, the definition includes, the many diverse microscopic life forms which
can be and are utilized in programs of biological control. .. ").
77. H.R. REP. No. 44, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1985).
78. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-164, 166-167 (West 1982).
79. Id. §§ 150aa-jj. The Secretary of Agriculture has jurisdiction over interstate movement
of "plant pests." The statutory definition of "plant pest" includes:
insects, mites, nematodes, slugs, snails, protozoa, or other invertebrate animals,
bacteria, fungi, other parasitic plants or reproductive parts thereof, viruses, or any
organisms similar to or allied with any of the foregoing, or any infectious substances,
which can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in any plants or
parts thereof, of any processed, manufactured, or other products of plants.
Id. § 150aa(c).
80. See Fogleman, supra note 9 at 245.
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objectivity of the USDA in regulating biotechnology has been ques-
tioned because of the agency's role in promoting agriculture.8'
In 1984 the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) published a proposed framework recommending regulation of
biotechnology under existing laws by the NIH, EPA, USDA, FDA,2
and NSF.83 The Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee (BSCC) 4
was set up to coordinate the policies of the various agencies. The
BSCC, however, has no independent authority to regulate the free
release of bioengineered organisms or to enforce compliance by the
various agencies.85 Thus, to have effectiveness as a coordinating com-
mittee, the BSCC must depend on voluntary agency compliance with
policies formulated by the BSCC.
Adequate safety review by the public of the ecological consequences
emanating from the free release of bioengineered organisms may be
impossible because of the lack of a central agency with complete
regulatory authority over recombinant DNA technology.86 Under the
present regulatory framework, several agencies with separate mandates
may evaluate the risk of a proposed free release differently, resulting
in inconsistent regulatory decisions. Additionally, because a particular
bioengineered organism may be subject to the jurisdiction of several
agencies, inter-agency conflicts can develop. Finally, not all bioengi-
neered organisms will necessarily be subject to federal regulation be-
cause an organism must meet the definitional requirements of agency
jurisdiction. The morass of the existing regulatory framework increases
the likelihood of bioengineered organisms wreaking havoc in the ecology.
81. See id. at 246-47 (USDA could face dilemma if called upon to regulate genetically
altered organisms that harm the environment but also promote agricultural production).
82. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has authority over drugs manufactured
%%ith recombinant DNA technology and authority over human gene therapy. See generally
Naumann, supra note 8, at 70-73. The FDA does not regulate the kind of bioengineered
organisms discussed in this comment.
83. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed.
Reg. 50,858, 50,905 (1984); See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51
Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986) (final version published in June 1986).
84. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment of the Bio-
technology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,176 (1985); Charter of
the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee of the Federal Coordinating Council of
Science, Engineering, and Technology, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,221 (1986) (BSCC was chartered on
Oct. 30, 1986, and after two years renewal of the charter will be reviewed).
85. Blue Sheet, Nov. 20, 1985, at 2.
86. See generally Federal Policy Could Miss Full Review of Some Harmful Products,
Scientists Say, 10 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 516, 516 (July 25, 1986) (criticism of the Coordinated
Framework by representatives of the American Society for Microbiology and the Ecological
Society of America).
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III. PROBLEMS FOR THE BIOENGINEERING INDUSTRY
A. Unpredictability of Risks and Lack of Precedential Cases
Potential massive liability for remote risks combined with the unset-
tled nature of bioengineered products liability discourages development
and implementation of new products.8 7 Insurers are reluctant to offer
coverage for recombinant DNA products because of the lack of judicial
precedent 8 that would guide insurers in assessing potential liability. A
second factor contributing to the unavailability of insurance is the
difficulty in assessing the risk that a bioengineered organism will cause
harm.89 The extent of the risk of harm cannot be fully revealed even
with the best efforts of the manufacturer.90 Implementing a new product
may depend on the availability of liability insurance. 9 Therefore, the
inability to overcome the difficulties in risk assessment and the lack of
precedent leads to a bottleneck in the development of recombinant
DNA technology. Growth of the industry is further hindered by the
reluctance of investors to finance innovative bioengineering projects
because of the threat of mass tort liability. 92
1. Strict Liability for Wild Animals or Animals with Dangerous
Propensities
In assessing the potential tort liability for genetically altered products,
insurers and investors can only speculate on the appropriate basis of
liability. Under modern tort law, the principles of strict liability can
be applied in situations involving an owner of wild animals or animals
87. See O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 469 (marketability of product depends on insurance,
which in turn depends on skilled assessment of the potential exposure to products liability
verdict).
88. The cases to date have only involved attempts to enjoin free releases.
89. See O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 486.
90. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF HousE COMM. ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATION OF GENETIC ENOI-
NEERINO, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984) (congressional report concludes that "predicting the
specific type, magnitude, or probability of environmental effects associated with the deliberate
release of genetically engineered organisms will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, at the
present time").
91. See O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 469 (insurance is important factor in marketability of
product).
92. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 485-86.
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with dangerous propensities. 93 Categorizing microorganisms such as
bacteria as wild animals will depend on whether courts apply a broad
or narrow definition to "wild animals." 94 However, bioengineered
nitrogen-fixing plants and disease-resistant crops are plants and cannot
be categorized as animals. Therefore, using the categories of wild
animals or animals with dangerous propensities as a basis for strict
liability will not cover all recombinant DNA products.
If the courts categorize bacteria as animals with dangerous propen-
sities, liability of the manufacturer is limited to harm within the scope
of the abnormally dangerous propensity. 95 The manufacturer must know
or have reason to know of the abnormally dangerous propensity. 96
Because one of the risks of recombinant DNA technology is that a
dangerous propensity of an organism may be unknown, 97 the require-
ment of knowledge raises the possibility that a genetically altered
organism could cause harm yet the bioengineer would not be held
strictly liable. Moreover, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS limits
strict liability to animals with abnormal dangerous propensities. 98 Man-
ufacturers may argue that the dangerous propensities of their products
cannot be eliminated and inhere in the nature of the technology.
Therefore, bioengineers will claim that since a particular product is
socially desirable, the dangerous propensity of that product should not
be categorized as abnormal. 99
2. Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Classifying the use of recombinant DNA products as an abnormally
dangerous activity is another basis for strict liability.'0° The RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS offers six factors for analyzing whether the
use of genetically altered organisms is an abnormally dangerous ac-
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 506-09 (1977).
94. See Comment, Creation of Life: A New Frontier for Liability?, 13 PAC. L.J. 99, 104-
05 (1981). See also RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 506 and § 507 (1977).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 (1977). See Comment, supra note 94, at 105-
06.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 (1977).
97. See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 comment e (1977).
99. The Restatement (Second) of Torts uses the example of Burma cattle which are more
wild and dangerous than other breeds but because of the social desirability of the Burma cattle
they are not categorized as having abnormal dangerous propensities. Id.
100. Id. § 519 (1977).
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tivity.01 The first three factors evaluate risk: the existence of a high
degree of risk, likelihood of great harm, and inability to eliminate risk.
Regarding the first factor, scientists disagree about the degree of risk
of some harm occurring. The second factor favors imposing strict
liability because scientists generally agree the extent of any harm that
occurs in a worst-case scenario involving a genetic engineering accident
will be great. 02 Under the third factor, bioengineering plaintiffs will
want to show that the state of the art of biotechnology did not allow
elimination of the risk and thus engaging in recombinant DNA tech-
nology should be classified as an abnormally dangerous activity. The
last three factors focus on the activity: whether the activity is a matter
of common usage, the appropriateness of the place where the activity
is carried on, and whether the value to the community is outweighed
by the dangerous attributes of the activity. These three factors will
weigh less heavily in favor of imposing strict liability as the use of
genetically altered products becomes a matter of every-day usage. 03
3. Strict Products Liability
Under a strict products liability analysis, 04 the bioengineering man-
ufacturer may be held liable for a defect in manufacture, 05 a defect
101. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 520 provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id. § 520 (1977). See generally Comment supra note 94, at 106-13.
102. See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text (risks associated with rDNA technology
difficult to assess but extent of harm if accident does occur could be catastrophic).
103. See Karny, Regulation of Genetic Engineering: Less Concern About Frankensteins
But Time for Action on Commercial Production, 12 U. ToL. L. REv. 815, 855-56 (1981) (use
of dynamite could be considered abnormally dangerous if used in residential neighborhood
but would not be considered abnormally dangerous if used in undeveloped area. As more and
more rDNA products are used safely in agriculture and industry, the courts will be less likely
to impose strict liability).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) (definition of strict products
liability).
105. See Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of "Defect," 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30,
33 (1973) (fabrication or construction of product is defective if specific product was not at
time of sale by the maker or other seller in the condition that the maker intended it to be).
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in design of a product,'-' or failure to provide an adequate warning
of a risk inherent in the product. 07 Design defect is the most likely
basis of litigation for recombinant DNA products since genetically
altered organisms generally do not have manufacturing defects.1s In
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,109 the California Supreme Court set
forth two alternative tests for determining the defectiveness of a design:
(1) the consumer expectation test and (2) the risk/benefit test."10
Under the consumer expectation test, a product is defective if it does
not "perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.""' Applying
this test, a bioengineering manufacturer could be held liable if the
genetically altered organism causes an ecological catastrophe. For ex-
ample, a farmer using ice-minus bacteria on strawberry plants to reduce
frost damage would not expect the bacteria to have the capability of
altering rainfall patterns. If the ice-minus bacteria did alter rainfall
patterns, the product would have failed to perform safely as expected
by an ordinary consumer and thus would be considered to have a
design defect.
Under the Barker risk/benefit test, several factors must be considered:
the gravity of the danger, the likelihood of the danger occurring, the
feasibility and cost of a safer alternative design, and the adverse
consequence to the consumer or product resulting from an alternative
design." 2 If a bioengineering catastrophe does occur, the gravity of the
danger will be considered great. However, the likelihood of catastrophe
will probably be assessed as minimal. The defendant bioengineering
manufacturer may be able to prove that an alternative design, such as
using an organism less likely to cause harm, was impossible. Alterna-
tively, the manufacturer may show the cost of a design alternative was
prohibitive. Imposing strict liability for defective design under the risk/
106. See id. at 33-34.
107. See id. at 34 (purchasers and those likely to use product may have been misinformed
or inadequately informed, either about the risks and dangers involved with using the product
or how, to minimize harmful consequences or risks associated with the product).
108. See generally Comment, Strict Product Liability for Injuries Caused by Recombinant
DNA Bacteria, 22 SANTA CLARA L. Rsv. 117, 143 (1982) (if the genetically altered organism
mutates during reproduction and the aberration is not discovered before marketing, the product
would contain a manufacturing defect).
109. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
110. "A product is defective in design, either (1) if the product has failed to perform
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner, or (2) ... if... benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design." Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
I1l. Id.
112. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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benefit test will depend on how the jury assesses the weight of these
various factors.
A major difficulty in assessing the potential tort liability arising from
genetically altered organisms is the questionable applicability of the
comment k"l exception for unavoidably unsafe products. Before a
product can be considered unavoidably unsafe, the utility and potential
benefits must outweigh known risks of the product. Drugs manufac-
tured with recombinant DNA technology that are lifesaving or in scarce
supply have great enough utility and benefit to outweigh the risk of
harm to a limited number of users. It is unclear, however, whether
recombinant DNA products other than drugs should be characterized
as unavoidably unsafe. Many of the free release products may simply
provide a more efficient form of agriculture or a less expensive method
of metal extraction than conventional technologies. The benefit and
utility of such products would not outweigh the risk of ecological
catastrophe; thus, the bioengineering manufacturer would not be im-
mune from strict product liability on the basis of unavoidably unsafe
products.
B. Trial Fairness Problems
At trial, bioengineering firms may face two major problems: jury
bias and erosion of the "state of the art" defense to strict products
liability. Properly assessing the complicated nature of the science in-
volved with recombinant DNA technology will test the limits of jury
competency. The popular press often exacerbates the jury's difficult
task of fair unemotional assessment by fostering a climate of fear
about recombinant DNA technology." 4 Vocal opponents of bioengi-
neering inspire public fears of scientists using recombinant DNA tech-
nology to create a "Frankenstein's monster.""15 Greater potential for
113. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs .... The seller of
such products .-. is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k at 353-54 (1977).
114. See Fogleman, supra note 9, at 194.
115. See Gaylin, The Frankenstein Factor, 297 Naw ENO. J. MED. 665 (1977) (discusses
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prejudice against the defendant is thus possible in a biotechnology
product liability case than with a conventionally manufactured product.
Potential jury bias against manufacturers of genetically altered products
may not by itself justify special legislation concerning recombinant
DNA technology. It is one of the factors, however, that should be
considered when analyzing whether the recombinant DNA industry
merits legislation specifically designed to accommodate litigants in a
recombinant DNA action.
The second major problem that recombinant DNA manufacturers
will face at trial concerns the difficulties of employing the state of the
art defense." 6 A defendant establishes the state of the art defense by
showing that the design of the product meets safety standards based
on scientific knowledge at the time the product was marketed." 7 Because
of the rapidly changing nature of the biotechnology industry, deter-
mining what the actual state of the art was at a particular point in
time is difficult, if not impossible." 8 With conventionally produced
products, the state of the art on a specific date can be reasonably
established by marketing, advertising, and government approvals." 9
Retrospective aids are not as readily available to the biotechnology
defendant because much of the work in the recombinant DNA industry
is done through unrecorded trade secrets.2' The defendant manufac-
turer's safety knowledge at the time of marketing is insufficient for
establishing industry custom or technological feasibility. Therefore, the
bioengineering defendant faces the possibly insurmountable task of
gathering information on feasible design options in an extremely diverse
industry.' 2' The state of the art defense protects conventional manu-
facturers from becoming insurers for all harms caused by their products.
Incapable of establishing the defense because of practical problems,
recombinant DNA manufacturers will face the unmitigated harshness
psychological reasons underlying the public anxiety about scientists "playing God" by creating
new life forms). See generally San Francisco Chron., Sept. 30, 1987, at A12, col. 1-6 (describing
effect vocal opponent of biotechnology, Jeremy Rifkin, has on the press).
116. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 12 (describes erosion of state of the art defense as
applied to biotechnology).
117. The standard of the state of scientific knowledge is based on either industry custom
or what was technologically feasible at the time of marketing. Id. at 456.
118. Id. at 466.
119. Id. at 476.
120. Id. at 476, n.91.
121. See generally id. at 476-77 (discusses evidentiary problems associated with state of the
art defense for biotechnology products).
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of strict liability whereas conventional manufacturers are not forced to
suffer the same burden.
III. OBSTACLES FOR PLMN S
A. Proving the Elements of a Cause of Action
Several obstacles may preclude plaintiffs from recovering for harm
caused by genetically altered organisms. The major problem is proof
of causation. Under either a negligence or strict liability cause of action,
a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the harm suffered
and the actions of the defendant.' To prove causation in a recombinant
DNA product liability suit, a plaintiff must identify the specific organ-
ism causing the injury, pinpoint the defendant as the source of the
organism and eliminate the possibility of alternate natural causes. 2 -
A plaintiff may face an insurmountable task trying to identify the
specific organism causing the injury in a recombinant DNA product
liability suit. Many of the harms associated with bioengineered organ-
isms are difficult to distinguish from naturally occurring causes. For
example, a stomach ailment caused by E. coli created with recombinant
DNA techniques would be indistinguishable from native intestinal
bacteria.
Pinpointing the source of the genetically altered product may be
an impossible task where several manufacturers produce identical
microbes.12 4 The court may permit a plaintiff to recover under a
market share theory of liability as in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 25
In Sindell, the plaintiff's injury was caused by the drug DES, but
she was unable to identify the manufacturer of the drug that was in
fact consumed. The plaintiff was allowed to recover an amount
proportional to the defendant's DES market share from each drug
manufacturer. The court did not require the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant produced the specific product that caused harm to the
122. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §
41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984).
123. See id. § 52, at 347-48. The possibility of an alternate natural cause does not necessarily
eliminate liability. If a single indivisible harm is suffered and the plaintiff can show the
defendant's action was a substantial factor in bringing about the loss, the defendant will be
held liable for the entire harm. Id.
124. See Karny, supra note 103, at 855.
125. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
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plaintiff. 2 6 The market share theory can only aid a plaintiff in
pinpointing the source of the organism, not in identifying the specific
organism that caused the harm. Because the plaintiff must overcome
the possibly insurmountable obstacle of identifying the specific ge-
netically altered organism that caused the harm, the market share
theory is a limited aid for recombinant DNA plaintiffs.
Bioengineering plaintiffs may have difficulty proving the causal
connection between the harm suffered and the defendant's action if
a high standard of proof is required. The nuclear industry is similar
to the recombinant DNA industry because both industries must
contend with uncertainty about the physical, ecological and environ-
mental ramifications of their products. In cases involving the nuclear
industry, the courts require a causal nexus virtually impossible to
meet. 27 The courts in radiation cases have required the plaintiff to
prove the injuries were caused "in reasonable medical probability"
by exposure to radioactive material. 2 8 Alternatively, some courts
have held that, even where an unusually high incidence of cancer or
loss of life is associated with radiation exposure, the causal connection
is not established if the exposure was within the limits of permissible
exposure set by the government. 2 9 In a conventionally manufactured
products liability case, scientific knowledge serves as a basis for
ascertaining reasonable probabilities. Because of scientific uncertainty
in the fields of nuclear energy and recombinant DNA technology,
however, the plaintiff has no basis for assessing the probability that
the harm suffered was caused by the defendant's action.
Another problem facing plaintiffs in a negligence cause of action
is the burden of proving breach of a duty. 30 If direct evidence of
126. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 588, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
127. See generally Friedman, Health Hazards Associated with Recombinant DNA Tech-
nology: Should Congress Impose Liability Without Fault?, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1355, 1367-70
(1978) (summary of the degree of proof required in radiation cases).
128. See, e.g., Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 1969)
(plaintiff was employed for 4 1/2 years as handler of radioactive materials and as production
operator assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons. After contracting cervical lymph node
cancer, plaintiff could not prove causal connection because of lack of reasonable medical
probability).
129. See, e.g., Bulloch v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956) (plaintiff suffered
unusually high loss of sheep after explosion of atomic devices. Even though evidence indicated
animals suffered from exposure to beta radiation and gamma rays, court denied requisite
causal connection had been established because dosages received were within permissible
exposure limits set by government); Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn.
1963) (employees of nuclear facility who contracted leukemia and Hodgkin's disease denied
recovery on basis of failure to establish causal connection), aff'd, 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir.
1964).
130. See W. KEaTON, supra note 122, § 30, at 164 (duty is an obligation recognized by
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the breach of duty is unavailable, the plaintiff may assert the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine allows an inference of negligence
from the fact that an injury has occurred. '3 Res ipsa loquitur requires
that the injury must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence. Proving this element of res ipsa loquitur
will be difficult for the recombinant DNA plaintiff because of the
subtle, yet grievous, harm that may be caused by a genetically altered
organism. For example, a change in the microclimate of an area
downwind from the application of ice-minus bacteria could result
from either natural weather changes or the ice-minus bacteria. Since
weather is an unpredictable element of nature, a plaintiff will have
difficulty in proving that a change in the climate does not normally
occur absent someone's negligence. Therefore, in the ice-minus sit-
uation, res ipsa loquitur cannot aid the plaintiff in proving breach
of duty even if the ice-minus bacteria was in fact the cause'32 of the
change in climate. A farmer unable to prove negligence would suffer
a grievous injury 33 yet receive no compensation for lost crops. The
bioengineering plaintiff thus faces a greater possibility of being denied
recovery under a negligence cause of action than does a conventional
products plaintiff because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will seldom
be available as an aid in proving breach of duty.
B. Additional Obstacles to Recovery of Compensation
Other obstacles to recovery exist for both conventionally manu-
factured product plaintiffs and bioengineering plaintiffs. Some of
these obstacles, however, are more burdensome for bioengineering
plaintiffs. One of the additional problems for recombinant DNA
plaintiffs is that the statute of limitations may bar a products liability
action. This is a particularly burdensome problem in jurisdictions
law that requires a person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks).
131. Id. § 39, at 242-44.
132. See notes 122-29 and accompanying text (decribes difficulty in proving causation; even
if the causal connection is shown, plaintiff must still prove breach of duty in a negligence
cause of action).
133. A change in the microclimate can have a serious detrimental impact on agriculture.
The growers of wine grapes, for example, depend on the unique microclimates of their hills
and valleys to give their wine the distinctive characteristics that make the difference between
good and great wine. A wine grower could be forced out of business if an application of a
genetically altered bacteria upwind caused a change in the microclimate yet would have no
recourse in a court of law because of problems of proof.
182
1988 / The Bioengineering Revolution
where the statute begins to run when the plaintiff is injured, whether
or not the injury is known to the plaintiff. 3 4 The bioengineering
plaintiff may not immediately perceive that an injury has been caused
by a genetically altered organism because many of the harms could
also result from natural causes. Thus, a plaintiff with a debilitating
illness might not correlate the injury with dispersal of a bioengineered
organism until several other people in the community had suffered
the same type of harm. Yet by the time the plaintiff realized the
injury was compensable, the statute of limitations may have run.
Some jurisdictions have modified the statute of limitations so that
the statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers the
injury.'35 This "discovery rule," however, is neither universally ac-
cepted nor uniformly applied to all tort actions within the same
jurisdiction. 3 6 Even if a court is sympathetic to the novel problems
faced by a plaintiff in a recombinant DNA case, the court is bound
by the legislative mandate of the state which may limit the applica-
bility of the discovery rule.
Another potential bar to recovery is the undiscoverability of a
bioengineering defect under a strict products liability analysis. Some
jurisdictions permit a defendant to avoid liability if a risk or hazard
related to the product was not discoverable under then existing
technology. 37 This defense would be particularly burdensome to a
recombinant DNA plaintiff due to the greater possibility of unknow-
able defects with bioengineered products than with conventionally
manufactured products. Recombinant DNA technology includes the
risk of unknowable defects. For example, a bioengineered organism
may have an undiscoverable capacity for causing disease 38 or an
organism released into the environment may establish itself in a niche
undiscoverable by modern methods of ecology. Environmental factors
not reproducible in a laboratory setting might trigger an expression
of the newly recombined genes and thus not be discoverable. Thus,
the very risks that make recombinant DNA technology a dangerous
enterprise will permit the bioengineering defendant to escape liability
on the basis of undiscoverability of the defect.
134. See W. KEETON, supra note 122, § 30, at 165-66.
135. Id. § 30, at 166.
136. See id. § 30, at 166-67. The discovery rule might be applicable to medical malpractice
cases in one jurisdiction but not be applicable to manufacturers of defective products within
the same jurisdiction. Id.
137. See id. § 99, at 700-01.
138. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text (pathogenic gene may be unknowingly incor-
porated with beneficial gene during splicing process).
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Another obstacle for the bioengineering plaintiff arises from the
fact that much of the research in recombinant DNA technology is
conducted by government sponsored universities and research insti-
tutions. Injuries resulting from a free release experiment performed
by a university researcher may be noncompensable under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.139 As genetic engineering becomes more en-
trenched in private manufacturing firms, sovereign immunity will
become less of an obstacle. Currently, however, as the first free
release experiments receive official approval, many of the experiments
will be done in universities. Many state sovereign immunity statutes
are patterned after the Federal Tort Claims Act, 40 which does not
provide for consent to be sued under the theory of strict liability.' 4'
In other states, the scope of consent is generally even more limited
than with the federal pattern. 42 Therefore, bioengineering plaintiffs
will probably find the doctrine of sovereign immunity to be a bar to
recovery.
The "mass exposure" type claims likely to occur in a bioengi-
neering products suit may be barred from a federal class action
because of the strict requirements for class action suits.4 -4 Class
action suits can mitigate economic obstacles such as the cost of
individualized litigation. To be certified as a class in federal court,
the plaintiffs must establish that there are common questions of law
or fact.' 4  Common questions of law may not be present because
members of a class suffering harm from a genetic engineering catas-
trophe are not likely to be restricted to one state. Because tort law
varies so much among the states, class certification will probably be
denied. 45 Presuming the commonality prerequisite is satisfied, only
one classification of the three types of class action provided for in
139. See generally Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, II GA. L. REv.
785, 806-10 (1977) (reviews state and federal sovereign immunity as applied to recombinant
DNA technology).
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the sovereign must consent to be sued. The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (West 1982), delimits the consent of
the federal government.
140. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (West 1982).
141. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953).
142. See Friedman, supra note 127, at 1363 n. 29.
143. See generally Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAv. L. REv. 851, 902-05 (1984) (description of the
"natural" advantages and economies enjoyed by defendants in mass exposure claims when
class action suits are not available to plaintiffs).
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).,
145. See e.g. In re Northern District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability
Litigation, 693 F. 2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) (in mass tort action variation in punitive damage
standards among the fifty jurisdictions caused the action to fail the prerequisite of common
question of law for class certification), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure146 is appropriate for mass tort
litigation.' 47 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) permits class
actions when actions by individual plaintiffs might impair interests
of class members who are not parties to the individual actions. 4 8
The requisite prejudice, however, may not be demonstrated merely
by showing that there is a risk that some claimants will recover while
others will be denied recovery if individual actions are permitted. 49
Finally, in a federal class action based on diversity of citizenship,
the requirement that every plaintiff meet the amount of controversy
prerequisite may be an insurmountable barrier to bringing a suit.'i °
Overcoming these obstacles will be a pyrrhic victory for the plaintiff
if no compensation is forthcoming from a manufacturer who is
bankrupt or otherwise judgment-proof.'' In the asbestos litigation
and the IUD cases, for example, the defendants sought refuge from
massive liability in bankruptcy.'5 2 These cases herald a disheartening
future for accident victims of genetic engineering."'
V. THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY AND THE
PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
A. History
The emerging recombinant DNA industry faces many of the prob-
lems raised by the privatization of the nuclear power industry in
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
147. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) are inappropriate for mass tort
litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966) (classification
permitting class actions where the court finds questions of law common to the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members is inappropriate for mass accident
litigation). See also Rosenfeld v. A. H. Robbins Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 11, 20, 407 N.Y.S. 2d
196, 201 (class certification denied in a strict products liability claim against an IUD manufac-
turer because whether the IUD was cause in fact of plaintiff's pelvic injuries required individual
determinations), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y. 2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 374 (1978).
Rule 23(b)(2) does not apply where money damages is the primary relief sought.
148. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 23(b)(1)(B).
149. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2 at 732-33 (1985).
150. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (amount in controversy must
exceed S10.000 for each member of the class).
151. See Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45-46 (1986).
152. See, e.g., Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceeding, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121. 1121-22 (1983).
153. See generally Abelson, New Biotechnology Companies, 219 SCIENCE 609, 609 (1983)
(many biotechnology firms are undercapitalized, making bankruptcy in the face of massive
liability more likely).
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1957. Lack of insurance stymied private industrial participation in
nuclear power. 54 Similar to the situation facing bioengineers, the risk
of a serious accident involving nuclear technology was considered
remote. Nevertheless, participants in the nuclear industry expressed
great concern about incurring astronomical liability if an accident
did occur.' 5  In addition, potential plaintiffs in a nuclear accident
suit faced the possibility of extensive injury without compensation
due to limitations in the tort law and variation among the states in
applying strict liability. 156
To address the concerns of the nuclear industry and to provide
public compensation in the event of a catastrophic nuclear accident,
Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act. 57 In exchange for an agree-
ment by the federal government to indemnify participants in the
nuclear power industry, a licensee of a nuclear power plant is required
to waive defenses 58 as to fault, conduct of claimant, charitable or
governmental immunity, and statutes of limitation. 5 9 This waiver has
the effect of imposing absolute liability on nuclear power partici-
pants. ,60
In addition to the waiver provisions, the licensee is required to
carry the maximum amount of private insurance available.' 6' Cur-
rently, aggregate liability for each nuclear incident is capped by the
Price-Anderson Act at $560 million. 62 In the event of a catastrophic
nuclear accident, original jurisdiction vests in the United States
District Court in the district in which the accident takes place. 163 If
the court determines liability may exceed the cap on aggregate lia-
bility, the Act sets forth procedures for apportioning claims and
154. See Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability and Indemnity, 71 MicH. L. REv. 479, 484
(1973).
155. Id. at 484-85.
156. See Note, The "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated
Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 360, 364-65 (1974).
157. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §
2210 (West 1970).
158. The waivers only apply when there is an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." 42
U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(1) (West 1970). To meet this threshold requirement a two prong test must
be fulfilled. There must be a substantial discharge of radioactive material and substantial
damage to persons or property must have resulted or will probably result. 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.81-
.85 (1974).
159. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, §3, 80 Stat. 891, codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2210(m)-(o) (West 1970). These provisions were not in the original Act.
160. See Green, supra note 154, at 496-97 (waiver provisions effectively imposed absolute
liability).
161. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2210(a)-(b) (West 1970).
162. Id. § 2210(e).
163. Id. § 2210.
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takes into account possible latent injury claims that may not be
discovered until a later time.'6
B. Constitutional Challenges to Price-Anderson
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 165
the Supreme Court considered constitutional challenges to the Price-
Anderson Act. Addressing the issue of whether the statutory limit
on liability contravened the due process clause, 6 6 the Court found
the Act should be accorded the traditional presumption of constitu-
tionality given to economic regulations. 67 Applying this presumption,
the Court upheld the Act absent proof of irrationality or arbitrari-
ness. 68 The Act passed constitutional muster because a rational
relationship exists between Congressional concern for stimulating
private nuclear industry and the imposition of a cap on liability to
encourage private industry participation. 69 The amount of the cap
was neither irrational nor arbitrary in light of the unlikelihood of a
nuclear accident exceeding the cap and the statutory commitment on
the part of Congress to take appropriate steps to protect the public
from the consequences of a nuclear disaster. 70
Another due process objection in Duke Power was based on the
Act's abrogation of common-law rights of recovery.' 7' The plaintiffs
claimed the Act did not provide a satisfactory quid pro quo for the
rights abrogated by the Act. 72 The Court noted the questionable
ability of a manufacturer to satisfy a judgment approaching the
amount guaranteed under the Act. 17 The Court also recognized the
speculative nature of the standard of liability state courts would
apply because of the lack of precedential nuclear accidents. 174 Finally,
the Court observed that the Act eliminates the burden of delay and
uncertainty that would follow from the need to litigate the question
of liability after an accident. 175 Therefore, the Court found that
164. Id. § 2210(o).
165. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
167. Duke Power, 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978).
168. Id. at 83.
169. Id. at 84.
170. Id. at 84-86.
171. Id. at 87-88.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 91.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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eliminating state law remedies did not violate due process because a
reasonably just substitute was provided by the assurance of a $560
million recovery fund and Congress' statutory commitment to "take
whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate." 1 76
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR RECOMBINANT DNA
FREE RELEASE INCIDENTS
A. Policy Rationale
Recombinant DNA technology is socially desirable and urgently
needed.177 A wide variety of useful applications involving free release
of genetically altered organisms potentially exists.178 For example,
microorganisms can facilitate in situ minings of metals such as
uranium. 7 9 Bacteria altered by recombinant DNA techniques can
break down toxic wastes.'80 The new technology can be used to
increase agricultural capacity by creating nitrogen-fixing'8 ' grain.' 2
Additionally, resistant varieties of crops, created with recombinant
DNA technology, can mitigate crop devastation from disease and
176. Id. at 87-92. The Court specifically did not resolve the question of whether the due
process clause requires duplication of a common law recovery or provision for a reasonable
substitute remedy since the Price-Anderson Act does provide a reasonably just substitute. Id.
at 88.
177. Maintaining the U.S. lead in the development of nuclear technology was a major
impetus in passing the Price-Anderson Act. See Note, supra note 156, at 362-63. An equal
concern for maintaining the U.S. biotechnology edge should motivate passage of legislation
designed to encourage the genetic engineering industry. The industry offers urgently needed
products in toxic pollution, resource recovery and agriculture. Bioengineering also presents the
United States with a critically needed opportunity to regain a leading place in the world
technological community.
178. See generally 1984 OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 159-250; 1981 OTA REPORT, supra
note 1, at 85-192.
179. See 1981 OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 117-19; Demain & Solomon, Industrial
Microbiology, Sci. AM., Sept. 1981, at 74 (bacteria broadcast on the area to be mined facilitates
extraction).
180. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (first microorganism to receive
patent was bacterium capable of breaking down chemicals found in oil spills). See also 5
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1002 (1981) (highly toxic chemicals such as dioxin and 2, 4, 5-T that
can be broken down by microbial action are the subject of research).
181. Nitrogen-fixation is the process of converting atmospheric nitrogen into nitrates.
182. Grain is an example of a genetically altered multicellular organism being released into
the environment. Nitrogen-fixing grain benefits agriculture by curtailing extensive use of
chemical fertilizers. The buildup over time of chemical fertilizers in the soil destroys the
agricultural capacity of the land. Chemical fertilizers also poison irrigation water. Serious
impacts on the reproductive capacity of waterfowl occur when the poisoned water eventually
flows into waterfowl nesting areas.
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insect damage. 83 The impact of an energy crisis can be mitigated by
using genetically altered organisms to make ethyl alcohol. Combining
gasoline with ethyl alcohol would lessen the demand for oil-based
fuels and thus stretch our oil reserves. 84
The unpredictable risks associated with recombinant DNA tech-
nology, the potential for incurring massive liability, and the unsettled
nature of tort law with regard to recombinant DNA products hinders
innovation and commercialization. When a bioengineered organism
is free released into the environment, extensive harm may occur
regardless of contrary predictions. Compensation for victims is likely
to be unavailable because of problems in proving causation, the
statute of limitations, immunity, and variation among the states of
strict liability principles. A Congressional solution should be adopted
that will encourage bioengineering innovation and industry compli-
ance with safety review and regulations while at the same time
ensuring compensation for those harmed by genetically altered or-
ganisms.
B. Provisions of the Proposed Legislation
Congress should clarify the roles of the various agencies currently
regulating the bioengineering industry. 85 To ensure adequate review
of ecological and environmental consequences, Congress should vest
authority for granting permits for the free release of genetically
engineered organisms in one agency. 8 6 Similar to the Price-Anderson
Act, a permit for free release will require a waiver of all defenses
including fault, immunity and the statute of limitations. To address
the problem of judgment-proof firms, a company wishing to engage
183. See, e.g., San Francisco Chron., Sept. 28, 1987, at A8, col. 6 (In May 1986 Agracetus,
of Wisconsin, performed outdoor field test of tobacco plants genetically engineered to resist
crown gall disease).
184. See Schmeck, Toward a New Scientific Industrial Revolution, CURRENT, Mar./Apr.
1980, at 43-44.
185. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy did not cite any legal
authority in setting up the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee. Clarification of
policies underlying federal laws is a function of the legislative and judicial branches, not the
executive. See Fogleman, supra note 9, at 234.
186. Authority could be vested in a presently existing agency such as the EPA or Congress
could create a commission in the form of a super-agency to resolve jurisdictional disputes,
review agency decisions and engage in independent rule making in areas of biotechnology not
already regulated. See generally Naumann, supra note 9, at 94-96 (description of suggested
super-agency). Analysis of the appropriate agency in which to vest regulatory authority for
free release is beyond the scope of this comment.
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in free release activities'17 will be required to carry private insurance
and enter into indemnification agreements with the government. 88
Indemnification by the federal government will remove the disincen-
tive caused by the potential for massive liability and will ensure an
adequate source of compensation in the event of an ecological
catastrophe. 8 9
An absolute cap on aggregate liability will be imposed for all
incidents involving a particular genetically altered organism. How-
ever, under the proposed legislation, Congress will make a commit-
ment to take necessary action to protect the public in the event the
cap on liability is exceeded. Actions that Congress should consider
if the liability cap is exceeded include: establishing a relief fund,
instituting cleanup measures, funding research to reverse the ecolog-
ical harm, or opening the public lands for homesteading by people
displaced in a bioengineering catastrophe. If the remote risks of harm
are realized with a particular organism, permission for further mar-
keting of that particular organism would not be granted. To benefit
from the cap on liability and the indemnification agreement, a firm
must fully comply with all federal safety review and regulations and
obtain a permit for free release or a license to market a free release
organism. Thus, the cap on aggregate liabiity cannot be abused by
firms seeking to market an organism for which no liability can be
imposed.
A major difference between the Price-Anderson Act and the pro-
posed recombinant DNA legislation exists in the threshold provision
of Price-Anderson. Only an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" trig-
gers the waiver of defenses provision under Price-Anderson. 190 This
threshold provision is another obstacle to recovery for nuclear acci-
dent victims. Since a major impetus for the recombinant DNA
legislation is removal of the obstacles to recovery of compensation,
a minimum threshold amount of damages is not required to trigger
the waiver of defenses provision in the proposed legislation.
187. Free release activities will be defined in the legislation to include research requiring
free release and marketing any genetically engineered organism designed to be used in free
release.
188. The agency vested with authority to regulate free release will establish the amount of
insurance required. The actual figure is beyond the scope of this comment.
189. See Friedman, supra note 124, at 1374-76 (analysis of why indemnification by the
federal government is appropriate). As in Price-Anderson, the proposed legislation would hold
harmless the indemnitee for liability exceeding the maximum amount of private insurance
available.
190. See generally Note, supra note 156, at 378-84 (criticism of threshold requirement in
nuclear cases).
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A second major difference between Price-Anderson and the pro-
posed recombinant DNA legislation involves the proof of causation.
The Price-Anderson Act requires the traditional "preponderence of
the evidence" rule for causation.' 91 Many of the environmental harms
that could be caused by a bioengineered product are equally attrib-
utable to natural environmental factors. Therefore, the Price-Ander-
son standard of proof is difficult to meet. 92
Under the proposed legislation, the plaintiff's burden of proof is
reduced. The proposed legislation envisions a two step process for
establishing the extent of liability for a bioengineering defendant.
First, the plaintiff will have to show that the harm could have been
caused by the genetically altered organism produced by the defendant
manufacturer. Proof of this part of plaintiff's cause of action will
not have to meet the preponderence of the evidence rule. Once the
plaintiff has fulfilled the first step, a rebuttable presumption will be
raised that the defendant's bioengineered product is the cause of the
harm. The burden of proof'93 will then shift to the defendant to
rebut the presumption or to limit liability proportionally. The pro-
portional liability will be based on a ratio of the likelihood of the
injury having been caused by the bioengineered product to the
likelihood of the harm having resulted from natural or alternative
artificial sources. 194
191. See id. at 372.
192. Proof of causation presents difficulties in other mass exposure cases such as toxic
tort litigation and low level radiation exposure. The manifestation of harm may be delayed,
multiple causes can interact in complex, unknown ways, and the harm may be indistinguishable
from harm resulting from natural or other man-made causes. See Schmalz, On the Financing
of Compensation Systems, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 813 (1985).
193. The burden of proof encompasses both the burden of going forward with the evidence
and the burden of persuasion. The California Evidence Code divides rebuttable presumptions
into those implementing public policy and those that simply facilitate the determination of the
action. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 603, 605 (West Supp. 1988). Because the proposed legislation
reflects public policy and is intended to do more than simply facilitate litigation, the burden
of persuasion is shifted to the defendant like other rebuttable presumptions under Evidence
Code section 605.
194. Shifting the burden of proof is justified for several reasons. The defendant bioengineer
is likely to have superior knowledge that can enable establishment of a lack of causation. See
Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). A defendant
engaged in an enterprise for profit is in the best position to spread the loss among the public.
Requiring an innocent party to bear the loss is unjust when the cost is more appropriately
charged against our complex and dangerous society. Thus, as between an innocent plaintiff
and a defendant who profits from an enterprise causing harm, the burden of proof is most
appropriately allocated to the defendant. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal.
App. 2d 774, 785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (1967). See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.
3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (court shifted the burden of proof to the
manufacturer of persuading the trier of fact that the product was not defective).
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A two-pronged test must be satisfied to fulfill the first step of
showing that the harm could have been caused by the genetically
altered organism. A plaintiff will have to demonstrate both exposure
to a genetically altered organism and an injury that could be caused
by exposure to the organism. In proving the second part of this two-
pronged test, the plaintiff will be aided by a series of rebuttable
presumptions drawn up by the agency in charge of free releases. The
agency will establish presumptions for all foreseeable risks before
free release is permitted.'95 The agency may determine the probability
of the genetically altered organism causing the particular harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff is less than fifty percent. In a preponderence
of the evidence jurisdiction, the plaintiff could be barred from
recovery whereas under the proposed legislation, the plaintiff will
recover.
Use of the agency's rebuttable presumptions will require a mini-
mum threshold of damages in order to avoid nuisance suits. Because
the waiver provisions will not depend on a minimum amount of
damages, the plaintiff still will have the benefit of no problems with
proof of fault, statute of limitations, and immunity. By eliminating
the benefit of the agency's probability determinations, however, the
plaintiff will have to expend money on research and investigation.
If the plaintiff does not meet the minimum threshold of damages, a
more-likely-than-not standard on the issue of causation is required
before the burden shifts to the defendant to limit proportional
liability. Once a plaintiff has met this higher burden of proof,
however, a plaintiff should be afforded the benefit of the waiver
provisions regardless of the measure of damages.
For risks not calculated by the agency because the risks were
scientifically unknowable and unpredictable, the plaintiffs will be
allowed to use epidemiological studies. Epidemiological methods cor-
relate injuries or disease occurring at a particular time with special
causes not generally present in the affected locality. 96 Epidemiology
195. For example, a foreseeable risk of bacteria genetically engineered to break down toxins
in oil is that the bacteria would not die out once done with consuming an oil spill but would
survive and go on to consume natural oil reserves. The agency would establish that a depletion
in oil could be caused by the bioengineered bacteria with a specified probability. If a plaintiff
suffered an oil loss and could show that oil reserves had been exposed to such bacteria, the
burden would shift to the defendant bioengineer to limit liability proportionally.
196. See Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic
Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 683, 709-12 (1977) (describes the use
of epidemiological studies in Japan to demonstrate causal connection between health injuries
and toxic substances).
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will aid the plaintiff in showing the possibility that a harmful change
in the ecology or incidence of disease is related to the free release
of a genetically altered organism. 97
The effect the proposed legislative scheme would have on recom-
binant DNA litigation can be illustrated by the case of ice-minus
bacteria. Before permitting free release, the agency would determine
the probability that a change in microclimate could be caused by the
ice-minus bacteria. If a farmer near the area of free release demon-
strates that the free release has in fact occurred and meets the
minimum threshold of damages, a rebuttable presumption would
arise that the defendant manufacturer's bioengineered bacteria caused
the change in the microclimate. The defendant manufacturer could
now try to prove that the original presumption of the agency was
wrong and that the bacteria could not have caused the change in
microclimate. The manufacturer, however, has the burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the agency's presumptions are wrong. 9
If the manufacturer fails to rebut the agency's presumption, limiting
proportional liability is the next step. If the agency determined the
probability of the ice-minus bacteria effecting a change in microcli-
mate was 0.002, the manufacturer could bring forth evidence to show
other environmental factors could have contributed to the change in
climate. The manufacturer might demonstrate the probability of these
other environmental factors was 0.003. Because the ratio is 0.002:0.003,
the bioengineer would be liable for two fifths, or forty percent of
the damages.
The final difference between Price-Anderson and the proposed
legislation is in preemption of state law remedies. In Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 99 the Supreme Court found that Congress had
not expressed an intention to preempt state remedies in passing the
Price-Anderson Act. In the proposed legislation, Congress must
express a clear intent to preempt state law because subjecting a
bioengineering firm to additional claims would obviate the benefits
of the cap on liability. To benefit from the cap on liability, however,
a bioengineering firm will have to comply fully with all federal
regulations. A firm engaging in malicious conduct will not be com-
197. A plaintiff using epidemiology to establish the causal connection will not have to
meet the more-likely-than-not standard of proof if the minimum threshold of damages is met.
198. By imposing this burden on the manufacturer, research into the environmental effects
will be encouraged because the manufacturer can escape liability this way. The manufacturer
must still pay for private insurance (as required by the proposed Act); by reducing exposure
to liability, the manufacturer will receive lower insurance premiums.
199. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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plying with the agency regulations. Therefore, willful and malicious
conduct, which normally subjects a defendant to punitive damages,
will eliminate the protections of the cap and indemnification provi-
sions. The plaintiff will have the burden of proving by a preponder-
ence of the evidence noncompliance with federal regulations on the
part of the defendant.
C. Possible Constitutional Objections
Manufacturers may claim that the proposed legislation imposes
liability without proof of causation and that this is a denial of due
process. The proposed legislation, however, does not eliminate the
requirement of a causal nexus. First, the plaintiff must show exposure
to a product manufactured by the defendant bioengineer. Second,
the plaintiff must show that such exposure could have caused the
injury. 20° By permitting the plaintiff to use the rebuttable presump-
tions drawn up by the agency regarding foreseeable risks, the legis-
lation does not eliminate the requirement of a causal nexus. Rather,
in determining foreseeable risks, the agency establishes a probability
that the bioengineered organism could have a causal connection to
the harm. Thus, the legislation only lowers the standard of proof
required for the prima facie case of the plaintiff. Not until the prima
facie case is established does a rebuttable presumption arise that then
shifts the burden to the defendant to either rebut causation or limit
liability proportionally.
An analogy may be made to worker's compensation laws. The cost
of work-related injury is assigned to the employer because of the
inherent hazards of industrial employment and not because of pres-
umptions that the employer is at fault. 20' The employer is chosen as
the most appropriate source for allocating the burden of compensa-
tion.202 Similarly, the proposed legislation for recombinant DNA
technology passes the costs of the uncertainty and difficulty of proof
of causation onto the manufacturers who profit from the implemen-
tation of the new technology. In return for bearing these costs,
manufacturers are protected by proportional liability and a cap on
aggregate liability for a single organism.
200. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
201. See LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (Desk Ed.) § 2.20.
202. Id.
1988 / The Bioengineering Revolution
Due process objections may be made because state law remedies
are abolished. The United States Supreme Court has found there is
no fundamental right to particular state law tort claims and that
these claims may be abolished when Congress legislates within its
appropriate sphere. 23 In the case of recombinant DNA technology,
Congress has power to legislate under the commerce clause. 204 As
with the analysis of the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act,
a substantial compensation fund is assured and barriers to recovery
are removed by the proposed legislation. Furthermore, defendants'
liability is limited to encourage industry growth and cooperation with
regulatory review. This legislative solution will survive constitutional
challenge because a rational relationship exists between the proposed
legislation and the twin goals of stimulating the safe development of
recombinant DNA technology and providing for adequate compen-
sation for victims of a bioengineering catastrophe.
CONCLUSION
The present tort system is ill-equipped to handle the mass tort
litigation likely to occur in the event of a catastrophe caused by the
free release of a genetically altered organism. Compensation for the
victims of such a catastrophe will be denied because of problems in
proof of causation, statute of limitations, defects undiscoverable at
the time of marketing, governmental immunity, restrictions on class
action suits, and bankruptcy by firms subject to massive liability.
Defendants face the possibility of unfair hearings because of jury
bias and evidentiary problems associated with the state of the art
defense. The prospect of extensive liability and a reluctance by the
insurance industry to provide coverage for recombinant DNA prod-
ucts fosters an inhospitable environment for bioengineering innova-
tion.
Under the commerce clause, Congress has the authority to regulate
and dictate the terms of implementation of recombinant DNA tech-
nology. The potential risks are similar to that of the nuclear power
industry. The legislation adopted with regard to the nuclear power
industry can serve as a model for the safe encouragement of bioen-
gineering while providing for adequate compensation for harm caused
by the new technology.
203. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929).
204. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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Legislation similar to the major provisions of the Price-Anderson
Act must be adopted. Three major modifications are recommended
to address fully the issues of ensuring compensation and fairness to
litigants. The triggering of the waiver provisions that in effect impose
strict liability should require no minimal threshold of damages.
Instituting rebuttable presumptions will aid the plaintiff in proof of
causation. Preemption of state law remedies will give the defendant
the full benefit of the cap on liability.
Bioengineering firms have developed products with commercially
applicable uses. Although recombinant DNA products can be of
extraordinary benefit to society, the potential for catastrophic harm
exists. A system must be established that will encourage compliance
with governmental safety regulations and ensure that the price for
the new technology is not imposed randomly on innocent bystanders.
Joanne M. Merry
